










THE SUSTAINABILITY OF FISCAL POLICY 






CESIFO WORKING PAPER NO. 1446 












An electronic version of the paper may be downloaded  
• from the SSRN website:              www.SSRN.com




THE SUSTAINABILITY OF FISCAL POLICY 





The paper examines the sustainability of U.S. fiscal policy, finding substantial evidence in 
favor. I summarize the U.S. fiscal record from 1792-2003, critically review sustainability 
conditions and their testable implications, and apply them to U.S. data. I particularly 
emphasize the ramifications of economic growth. A “growth dividend” has historically 
covered the entire interest bill on the U.S. debt. Unit root tests on real series, unscaled by 
GDP, are distorted by the series’ severe heteroskedasticity. The most credible evidence in 
favor of sustainability is the robust positive response of primary surpluses to fluctuations in 
the debt-GDP ratio. 
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1. Introduction 
The U.S. fiscal balance has shown tremendous variation in recent years. Large budget deficits in the 
1980s and early 1990s triggered a substantial literature examining the sustainability of U.S. budget 
deficits. Concerns about U.S. budget deficits evaporated in the late 1990s, as deficits turned into 
record surpluses, leaving a stack of unreconciled theoretical and empirical findings. As the U.S. fiscal 
balance has turned sharply negative since 2001, the sustainability of U.S. fiscal policy is again a 
pressing issue.  
  This paper critically reviews the conceptual issues and presents new evidence, drawing on the 
historical record of U.S. fiscal policy from 1792-2003. Section 2 lays out a framework and 
summarizes U.S. data, emphasizing the role of economic growth. Sections 3-4 examine commonly 
used “ad hoc” versions of the government’s intertemporal budget constraint (IBC) and test the implied 
stationarity restrictions. Sections 5-6 derive the IBC in a general equilibrium setting and examine its 
theoretical and empirical implications. U.S. primary surpluses are found to respond positively to 
fluctuations in public debt. This response satisfies a sufficient condition for sustainability. Section 7 
briefly comments on seignorage, on the fiscal theory of the price level, and on social security. Section 
8 concludes.  
2. U.S. Fiscal Data and Economic Growth 
Starting point for analyzing government budgets is the budget identity linking the deficit to revenues, 
spending, and public debt. The deficit is the difference between outlays and revenues. It also equals 
the change in public debt. In algebraic terms, let DEFt denote the with-interest deficit in year t, Tt total 
revenues, Gt non-interest spending, Dt-1 the public debt at the end of year t-1 (all in nominal dollars), 
and it the interest charge. The budget identities are then 
  DEFt = Gt −Tt + it ⋅ Dt−1 (1) 
and  Dt = Dt−1 + DEFt (2a)  
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Most policy debates about the U.S. budget deficit focus on the nominal with-interest deficit (“headline 
deficit”), and on the resulting buildup of Public Debt.1 Data for revenues and outlays are commonly 
taken from the Unified Budget, which includes social security and other trust fund accounts as well as 
Federal Reserve transfers to the Treasury.  
  Figure 1 displays the headline deficit for 1900-2003 and Congressional Budget Office (CBO) 
projections (dotted) for 2004-2014. Visible as downward spike are the surpluses of the late 1990s, 
bracketed by large deficits in the 1980s and in the post-2001 period. Pre-1970 deficits are barely 
visible in nominal dollar terms, apart from WWII. Post-1970, the U.S. government has run budget 
deficits every year, except for 1998-2001. In Figure 1, the 1990s surpluses look like outliers in a 
longer-run trend towards rising deficits. CBO projects substantial deficits into the indefinite future.2 
  Figure 2 displays U.S. public debt in nominal and real terms for 1900-2003. The run-up in 
nominal debt reflects the deficits shown in Fig.1, highlighting the rapid debt-growth since 1980 and 
the “pause” in debt growth in the 1990s. Adjusting for inflation magnifies historical debt values 
relative to recent ones. In the real series, debts from WWI become noticeable, but pre-1916 values 
look negligible relative to current debt. The real series shows that debt growth from 1950-80 was 
entirely nominal, whereas the post-1980 debt growth was real. 
  Figure 3 displays the ratio of U.S. public debt to the size of the economy (GDP) for 1791-
2003. Scaling debt by the size of the economy further shrinks recent debt values relative to earlier 
ones, enough that it becomes instructive to display the entire history of U.S. debt. The debt-GDP ratio 
suggests a more benign view of U.S. fiscal policy than the nominal and real series. The 36% debt-GDP 
ratio in 2003 is comparable to the starting value in 1791 (about 40%). With the exception of WWII, 
the U.S. time series lies below 60%, the value European politicians seem to view as hallmark of a 
responsible fiscal policy.  
                                                      
1 I follow the sustainability literature and disregard the U.S. government’s ownership of real and financial assets; this is in 
effect asking if U.S. policy is sustainable without asset sales. Otherwise, (2a) would have to be modified to equate the deficit 
to the change in government liabilities minus the change in assets. Treasury cash balances should also be deducted from 
Public Debt, but they are small enough to be ignored. 
2 CBO provides “baseline” projections and several alternatives. The baseline abide by politically mandated assumptions and 
must be interpreted with caution.  To avoid the baseline assumption, the projections in Figure 1 show CBO projections of 
President Bush’s budget (as of March 2004).  
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  Figure 3 also highlights the central role of wars in the build-up of debt. Five major wars—the 
War of Independence, Spanish-American War, the Civil War, World War I and World War II—were 
largely deficit-financed. This explains the high debt-GDP ratio in 1791 and the sharp increases in 
1812-16, 1861-66, 1916-19, and 1941-46. The debt-GDP ratio has generally declined during 
peacetime periods, with the exception of the Great Depression/New Deal era (1929-39), the 1980s, and 
the post-2001 period. One might even interpret the 1980s as hot phase of the Cold War and the post-
2001 period as the War on Terror, which would leave the Great Depression as the sole episode of 
peacetime increases in the debt/GDP ratio.  
  While Fig.2-3 refer to U.S. Public Debt, press reports about U.S. debts sometimes refer to a 
different concept, Gross Federal Debt. The latter includes intra-governmental obligations to social 
security and other trust funds, and it far exceeds the public debt ($6700bill. vs. $3914bill. as of 
Sept.2003). Eq. (2a) does not apply to Gross Debt unless one uses a different, much narrower deficit 
concept that excludes social security and other trust funds. My analysis follows the Unified budget 
(except Section 7 below), in effect disregarding intra-governmental flows.  
  Figure 4 displays the deficit-GDP ratio, the ratio of nominal headline deficits over GDP. The 
deficit-GDP ratio illustrates the extraordinary magnitude of wartime deficits, the persistently high 
deficits in the post-1980 period, and the late-1990s surpluses. Note that peacetime budget surpluses are 
not nearly as large as the wartime deficits, neither year-by-year nor as integral over time.  
  The contrast between the positive deficits in Fig.4 and the flat path of debt in Fig.3 illustrates 
a key point: The common intuition equating deficits with increases in debt does not apply to real 
values nor to GDP-ratios. While DEF = ∆D holds in nominal terms as shown in (2a), changes in real 
debt differ from the real value of the deficit by an inflation term,   















where  Pt is the price level (empirically, the GDP deflator) and πt = Pt /Pt−1 −1 is the inflation rate. 
Similarly, changes in the debt-GDP ratio differ from the deficit-GDP ratio by a nominal growth term,  














 (2c)  
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where Yt is nominal GDP and γt =Yt /Yt−1 −1 is nominal GDP-growth. The nominal growth term—a  
“growth dividend”—could be decomposed into an inflation term (as in (2b)) plus a real growth effect. 
I omit the decomposition to highlight that GDP-ratios are ratios of nominal dollar values and hence not 
subject to controversies about measuring inflation. Because of the inflation and growth effects, the 
interest charge it ⋅ Dt−1 in the headline deficit systematically overstates the impact of initial debt on 
real debt accumulation and on the debt-GDP ratio. This explains the mismatch between Fig.3 and 
Fig.4.  
 The  primary  deficit,  DEFt
0 = Gt −Tt, is useful in this context, both to separate the stock of 
debt from the flows of outlays and revenues, and to obtain a scale-invariant exposition of debt 
dynamics. From (1) and (2a), the nominal budget equation can be written as 
  Dt = Gt −Tt + (1+ it)⋅ Dt−1 = DEFt
0 + (1+ it)⋅ Dt−1. (3) 




























are similar in that they express period-t debt as sum of a flow variable—the primary deficit—and the 
previous period’s debt multiplied by a propagation factor. Let dt denote a generic, scaled version of 
debt (e.g., Dt or Dt/Pt or Dt/Yt, as needed), let st denote the corresponding version of the primary 
surplus (meaning −DEFt
0 or −DEFt
0 /Pt or −DEFt
0 /Yt), and let rt denote the appropriate version of 
the “return” on debt (meaning, rt = it or rt = (1+ it)/( 1+ πt)−1≈ it −πt or 
rt = (1+ it)/( 1+ gt)−1≈ it −γt). Then the dynamics of public debt can described compactly as  
  dt = (1+ rt)⋅ dt−1 − st (4) 
Eq.(4) demonstrates that budget accounting is scale-invariant if one uses the appropriate propagation 
factor. Eq.(4) also highlights that alternative tax and spending policies have an impact on debt 
accumulation only to the extent that they affect st and rt. 
  Table 1 documents the quantitative importance of economic growth for the dynamics of the 
U.S. debt. Column 1 shows average with-interest deficits in percent of GDP. Columns 2-4 displays 
corresponding values for the primary deficit, the nominal interest charge, and the growth dividend  
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from (2c), all in percent of GDP. In Col.5-6, growth dividend is decomposed into real growth and the 
inflation effect from (2b). Column 7 displays the average growth rate of the debt-GDP ratio.  
  Over the full 1792-2003 sample (top row), the U.S. government has run with-interest deficits 
averaging about 1.2% of GDP (col.1). Even excluding interest, the U.S. has run deficits averaging 
about 0.3% of GDP (col.2). The debt-GDP ratio, in contrast, has remained essentially constant (col.7), 
suggesting that (1+ it)/( 1+ γt)−1 must have been negative on average. Col.4 confirms that the 
growth dividend has been enough to cover average interest changes and primary deficits. Economic 
growth rather than primary surpluses have held down the debt-GDP ratio. 
  The role of economic growth is robust if one splits the sample. Sub-sample variations arise 
mainly because inflation rates differ in the pre- and post-Gold Standard periods and because sub-
samples may include an above or below average number of war years. If one splits the sample in 1914, 
the 1792-1914 sample shows a lower with-interest deficit, a declining debt-GDP ratio, and a primary 
surplus, whereas the 1915-2003 sample shows higher with-interest and primary deficits and an 
increasing debt-GDP ratio. While GDP growth for 1792-1914 was non-inflationary, inflation was a 
major component of nominal growth for 1915-2003. The increase in the inflation component (from –
0.02% to 1.17%) was matched almost one-for-one an increased nominal interest change (from 0.49% 
to 1.57%). This suggests that the Fisher effect reasonably approximates the long-run data, i.e., the 
relation between interest charge and growth dividend is not due to unexpected inflation. Similar results 
are obtained if one splits the sample in 1868.3 
  Table 2 displays average growth rates, inflation rates, and interest rates on the U.S. debt for 
the same sample periods as in Table 1. Col. 1-4 present essentially the same information as in Col.3-6 
in Table 1, but as simple averages rather than averages weighted by debt-GDP ratios (in Table 1). 
Table 2  confirms that average economic growth has usually exceeded the average interest charge on 
public debt.  
  Note that Table 2 does not allow inferences about the dynamic efficiency of the U.S. 
economy. As shown by Abel et al. (1989), dynamic efficiency depends on the relationship between 
                                                      
3 The 1914 split is motivated by WWI and  16
th Amendment, the start of income taxation. The 1868 split is motivated by the 
Civil war.  
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capital share and investment share in GDP (or approximately, the return on real capital and the growth 
rate). Abel et al. show that the U.S. capital share has consistently exceeded the investment share, 
indicating dynamic efficiency. Instead, Tables 1-2 suggest that the U.S. government has exploited the 
gap between the return on capital and the return on bonds to economize on its debt service. 
  In summary, for the last 200+ years the U.S. government has been able to rely on economic 
growth to keep its debt-GDP ratio from rising. Most of the time, the U.S. has had no need to run 
primary surpluses, and indeed, it did not run primary surpluses on average. Much of the sustainability 
literature, in contrast, starts from the premise that primary surpluses are necessary to keep the public 
debt from growing exponentially.  
3. Ad Hoc Sustainability 
This section will examine the U.S. fiscal record from an applied perspective and review sustainability 
conditions commonly used in the literature. In principle, sustainability involves two questions. Which 
fiscal policies are sustainable? And what can we say about the sustainability of particular policies 
encountered in practice?  
  Much of the sustainability literature has skipped the first question and focused on the 
empirical implications of a simple ad hoc definition of sustainability:  
Definition [Ad Hoc Sustainability]: A fiscal policy satisfies ad hoc sustainability, if it is on a 
trajectory such that the expected present value of future primary surpluses equals the initial debt.  
This is a flawed definition—as I will demonstrate—but worth examining, in part because it motivates 
standard empirical tests, in part to highlight the flaws.  
  From eq. (4), one can readily compute the paths of public debt implied by arbitrary sequences 
of primary surpluses and of interest charges,  


















⎜  ⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟  ⎟ ⋅ st+ j (5)  
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Conditions for ad-hoc sustainability are obtained from (5) in three steps, all of which are valid in 
nominal terms, in real terms, and for GDP-ratios. First replace the returns in (5) by a fixed value r and 
take conditional expectations, 




∑ (1+ r)n− j ⋅ Et[st+ j] 
where  dt
* = (1+ rt)⋅ dt−1 denotes debt at the start of period t and where  Et[⋅] denotes conditional 









(1+ r)n Et[dt+n] (6) 







∑ Et[st+ j]+ lim
n→∞
1
(1+ r)n Et[dt+n]. (7) 
Eq. (7) demonstrates that initial debt equals the expected present value of future primary surpluses if 







∑ Et[st+ j]  [Ad hoc IBC]  (8) 




n Et[dt+n]= 0.  [Ad hoc TC]  (9) 
Eq. (8) is commonly known as the Intertemporal Budget Constraint (IBC) and (9) as the Transversality 
Condition (TC).  
  The derivation highlights the arbitrariness of the discount rate r and the absence of an 
economic argument why potential buyers of government bonds should care about (8) or (9). The 
sustainability literature commonly interprets r as an expected return on government bonds, proxied by 
some historical average. Because (7) is an identity for any r, the IBC (8) has economic content only by 
the assertion that for the particular r-value chosen by the study’s author, (9) describes the bondholders’ 
transversality condition. This would make (9) a necessary condition for individuals to hold 
government bonds and would justify (8) as a true constraint on government policy.  
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  While early empirical work has attempted to test (9) directly,4 most research has focused on 
testing (8) by examining the unit root and co-integration properties of fiscal data. In an influential 
paper, Trehan and Walsh (1988) show that if real revenues, real spending, and real debt have unit 
roots, a stationary with-interest deficit is sufficient for (8-9). Equivalent statements (invoking the 
budget identity with fixed r) are that the primary surplus and debt are co-integrated with a co-
integrating vector (1,-r); or that revenues, non-interest spending, and debt are co-integrated with vector 
(1, -1, -r). Trehan and Walsh (1991) generalize this result in two directions: With variable discount 
rates, IBC holds if debt is difference-stationary and if the discount rate is strictly positive and bounded 
away from zero. Alternatively, covering the case of non-stationary with-interest deficits, IBC holds if 
debt a quasi-difference dt − λdt−1 of debt is stationary for some 0 ≤ λ <1+ r and if debt and primary 
surpluses are cointegrated.  
  Two simple observations provide an intuition for these unit root and cointegration results. 
First, it’s a math fact that exponential decay dominates polynomial growth. If debt is difference-
stationary with some finite mean δ, the expected debt n-periods ahead is approximately 
  Et[dt+n] ≈ d  t + n⋅δ,  
a linear function of n, where d  t denotes the permanent component of dt (as defined by Beveridge and 
Nelson 1981). Because (8) divides this expression by the exponential (1+ r)n, the dominance of 
exponential decay over linear growth implies a zero limit for any r>0.5 This explains Trehan and 
Walsh’s (1988) result and the difference-stationarity result in Trehan-Walsh (1991). Trehan-Walsh’s 
(1991) cointegration result derives from a second observation: exponential debt growth is consistent 
with (8) if the growth rate is strictly less than r (McCallum 1984). If dt − λdt−1 is stationary as 
Trehan-Walsh assume, the asymptotic rate of debt growth is λ −1, so λ <1+ r suffices for (8).  
                                                      
4 Hamilton and Flavin (1986) test (9) against the alternative of a “speculative bubble” by regressing a time series of U.S. real 
debt against an exponential terms of the order (1+r)
n
 and examine the significance of the exponential. They find no bubble in 
U.S. debt for 1960-84. Wilcox (1989) computes realized values of discounted debt, dt+n /( 1 + rt+k) k=0
n−1 ∏ , for fixed 
t=1960 and n=0…24, using real U.S. debt for 1960-84 and using the ex-post real returns on such debt. This yields an 
empirical counterpart to (9) that does not require a fixed interest rate, but it assert that the ex-post real return on debt is the 
appropriate discount rate; see Bohn (1995) for a critique. 
5 By the same argument, if debt were stationary after differentiating m times, for any finite m, expected debt would be an m-
th order polynomial in n, so (8) is satisfied for any r>0. I am not aware of a formal proof for this intuition.  
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  Trehan-Walsh’s (1991) cointegration result has a noteworthy additional implication. 
Cointegration between surplus and debt means that some linear combination st −α ⋅ dt−1 = ut is 
stationary, where α is a constant and ut a stationary process. Next period’s debt can then be written as 
dt+1 = (1+ r)⋅ dt − st+1 = (1+ r−α)⋅ dt + ut+1, so λ =1+ r−α and therefore α =1+ r− λ > 0. 
Trehan-Walsh’s (1991) assumptions therefore imply a strictly positive linkage between surplus and 
debt (α > 0).6  
  From an economic perspective, one might wonder about the types of polices that might lead to 
(8-9) being satisfied or violated. Two polar scenarios are instructive. First, suppose politicians are 
oblivious to public debt, making exogenous decisions about taxes and about non-interest spending. 
Then (8-9) are only satisfied by accident, only if the stochastic processes describing taxes and 
spending decisions happen to have the property that deficit-increasing shocks in one period are exactly 
offset in present value terms by deficit-decreasing shocks in subsequent periods (see Hansen et al 
1991). Secondly, suppose politicians are instead responsive to public debt. They are more cautious 
about tax cuts and about spending growth whenever the debt has increased, and more willing to cut 
taxes and to increase spending when the debt has decreased. Such responses to debt would implement 
an error-correction mechanism that might stabilize the debt or at least generate cointegration between 
debts and primary surpluses. The empirical question about sustainability is which of these scenarios 
better characterizes a country’s political process. 
  A disturbing feature of ad hoc sustainability is the apparent disconnect from practical politics. 
While political debates about sustainability are mostly about bounds on debt-GDP and/or deficit-GDP 
ratios, much of the academic literature has focused on real fiscal series and treats non-stationary debt-
GDP ratios as unproblematic. 
4. Empirical Analysis: Unit Roots versus Stationarity 
This section critically examines the time series properties of U.S. fiscal variables, focusing on unit root 
tests for ad hoc sustainability. Cointegration is not examined, to save space and because the 
                                                      
6 To anticipate, this linkage is consistent with policy reaction function examined below. Wickens and Uctum (1993) have 
derived similar linkages between external debt and the current account.  
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stationarity of a deficit measure and the cointegration of its non-stationary components are 
conceptually equivalent.7 
  Table 3 presents unit tests for real variables—for public debt, the with-interest deficit, the 
primary deficit, revenues, non-interest outlays, and a decomposition of non-interest outlays into 
military and non-military ones. The Phillips-Perron (PP) and augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) tests 
examine the null hypothesis of a unit root against a trend-stationary alternative; see Hamilton (1994) 
for technical details. The KPSS test examines the null hypothesis of trend-stationarity; see 
Kwiatkowski et al (1992). PP is robust with regard to heteroskedasticity but ignores autocorrelation 
beyond a finite lag window. ADF includes an autoregressive correction but ignores heteroskedasticity. 
To accommodate short-run dependencies, all results are reported for an AR(4) in ADF and for 12 lags 
in PP and in KPSS. All tests allow for a deterministic time trend in the stationary alternative. 
  The test results in Table 3 are statistically clear-cut. All the deficit measures appear to be 
stationary: ADF and PP reject a unit root while KPSS does not reject stationarity. All other variables 
appear to have unit roots: KPSS is rejecting trend-stationarity whereas ADF and PP are not rejecting 
unit roots. Importantly, one finds a stationary with-interest deficit in a setting with non-stationary 
revenues, outlays, and debt, a configuration that satisfies Trehan-Walsh’s (1988) sustainability 
condition. 
  The results about deficits are logically inconsistent, however. The with-interest deficit is a 
linear function of primary deficit and debt. Given a non-stationary debt, the with-interest deficit and 
the primary deficit cannot both be stationary. It appears that debt has such a small weight in the with-
interest deficit that the tests are not powerful enough to distinguish stationarity in (−st) from 
stationarity in (−st)+ rt ⋅ dt−1. It is unclear therefore which of the deficit measures is stationary, i.e., if 
Trehan-Walsh’s condition is satisfied. 
  The real time series also suffer from an enormous non-stationarity in variances. To illustrate 
the problem, Table 4 displays standard deviations of primary deficits and of the public debt for 
                                                      
7 Conceptually equivalent unit root and cointegration tests may still yield different results because different methods are used 
to distinguish short- from long-run relationships in the data and because the equivalence is exact only if the return on debt is 
constant and if all variables are measured consistently. An examination of such subtle differences is beyond the scope of this 
paper and would distract from more important issues. See Bohn (1991b) for cointegration results about U.S. fiscal policy.  
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selected sub-samples. The standard deviation of post-1900 real deficits exceeds the pre-1900 value by 
a factor 64. Even for post-WWII data (more commonly used in the literature) standard deviations are 
increasing over time, as illustrated by the split 1960-2003 sample. This cast some doubts on the unit 
root results, suggesting that the “stationary” real series in Table 3 are not truly covariance stationary.8 
Table 4 also documents that the standard deviations of GDP-ratios display much less growth over 
time, suggesting that the rising variances of real deficits and real debt are largely due to a growing 
economy. 
  Table 5 displays unit root tests for GDP-ratios of the same variables as in Table 3. For deficits, 
revenues, and non-military outlays, GDP-ratios have similar properties as the real series. All the 
deficit-GDP series appear stationary. Revenues and non-military outlays appear to have unit roots. 
Different results are obtained, however, for the debt-GDP ratio, for outlays/GDP and for military 
spending/GDP. For the debt-GDP ratio neither stationarity nor non-stationarity is rejected; for the 
outlay-GDP ratio both stationarity and non-stationarity are rejected; and military spending/GDP 
appears to be stationary.  
  Scaling by GDP may raise questions about the stationarity of U.S. GDP itself, the subject of 
an old controversy (Christiano and Eichenbaum, 1990). In my real GDP series, trend-stationarity is 
rejected for 1790-2003 (KPSS=0.347) but not for 1868-2003 (KPSS=0.069). A unit root is not 
rejected for either sample period (PP=-2.16 for 1790-2003, PP=-2.67 for 1869-2003). The evidence 
against a stationary GDP is weak, however, because the pre-1869 GDP data may be of lower quality 
than the more recent data. A unit root in real GDP is also consistent with the observation that some 
stationary GDP-shares in Table 5 become non-stationary when multiplied by GDP (notably public 
debt, see Table 3). Unit roots in Table 3 may simply reflect balanced growth without revealing much 
about fiscal policy. 
  Table 6 directly addresses the possibility that the time-series properties of real GDP might be 
unduly influence the results in Table 5. In Table 6, the real variables are divided by a common 
                                                      
8 In addition, the unequal variances imply that the OLS estimates underlying the unit root tests essentially disregard most of 
the sample—all but the most recent, most volatile observations. Phillips-Perron’s heteroskedasticity correction is based on a 
small number of autocorrelation, it’s ability to correct for this trend-type of heteroskedasticity is unclear.  
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exponential trend that captures average GDP growth for 1869-2003 (3.48 percent). The results are 
very similar to Table 5, documenting that differences between real series and GDP-ratios arise largely 
from reduced heteroskedasticity and are not induced by the time series properties of GDP.  
  Taking logs is a common device to remove growth in the variances of strictly positive 
variables (e.g., debt, revenues, and outlays, but not for deficits). Logarithms are not economically 
insightful here, however, because taking logs magnifies a series’ fluctuations near zero, whereas 
sustainability is primarily about how fiscal policy recovers from high values of debt and outlays. To 
illustrate this point, Figure 6 displays logarithms of real U.S. debt and real GDP; the gap is the log 
debt-GDP ratio. Log-debt is evidently dominated by the decline to near-zero debt in the 1830s and the 
subsequent return to more normal values, i.e., by a period that is uninformative about sustainability. 
Both PP and KPSS tests for log real debt are insignificant (PP=-3.08, KPSS=0.098), so log debt 
provides no better statistical insights than the GDP-ratio.  
  In summary, the econometric analysis yields three main conclusions. First, GDP-ratios and 
similarly scaled series provide more credible information about the fiscal series than raw real data. 
Second, there is no convincing evidence that the relationship between debt and deficits involves a unit 
root. All the deficit-GDP ratios are unambiguously stationary, and stationarity cannot be rejected for 
debt-GDP ratio. The failure to reject unit root for the debt-GDP ratio does not prove a unit root. Third, 
certain other GDP-ratios have unit roots. Revenues/GDP and non-military outlays/GDP are clearly 
non-stationary. Unit root tests for overall non-interest outlays are contradictory, but the non-
stationarity of the non-military component suggests that the series for non-interest outlays/GDP is best 
treated as non-stationary. Because the primary-deficit/GDP is found stationary, one may conclude that 
revenues and outlays are cointegrated with vector (1,-1). 
5. Model-Based Sustainability 
This section returns to the first conceptual question about sustainability: Which fiscal policies are 
sustainable? The basic economic answer is that an agent’s ability to borrow is constrained by other 
agents’ willingness to lend. The question which policies are sustainable is therefore a general  
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equilibrium question, a question of who the government’s potential lenders are and what determines 
their behavior. Different assumptions about lenders lead to different conclusion about the set of 
sustainable policies.  
  Constraints that superficially resemble the ad hoc TC and IBC are obtained if one assumes that 
potential lenders are infinitely-lived optimizing agents and that financial markets are complete. Such 
agents’ asset accumulation necessarily satisfies a transversality condition. Complete markets imply 
that agents apply a common pricing kernel to value financial assets, so the transversality conditions 
aggregate. Applied to government debt, the lenders’ transversality condition is 
  liminf
n→∞
Et[ut,n ⋅ dt+n]≤ 0   [General No Ponzi Cond.]  (10) 
where  ut,n is the economy’s pricing kernel for contingent claims on period t+n (see Bohn 1995). A 
violation of this condition (a strictly positive limit) would mean that some the debt’s initial value 
would never be repaid, i.e., represent a Ponzi scheme. Rational lenders would not buy such debt. From 
the government’s perspective, condition (10) is therefore a constraint, commonly known as No Ponzi 
Condition. 
  In principle, one cannot rule out debt policies for which (10) does not have a proper limit, nor 
policies that imply large surpluses and a negative limit in (10). Such policies would raise distracting 
new issues, however. So to limit the scope of this paper, it seems reasonable to assume that debt is 
non-negative and that the limit in (10) exists. Then (10) specializes to 
  lim
n→∞
Et[ut,n ⋅ dt+n]= 0.  [Simple No Ponzi Cond.]   (11) 
It is important in this context to distinguish the value of particular debt securities from the value of all 
outstanding public debt under various contingencies. In many countries, government bonds are safe 
securities that carry low promised interest rates, whereas government deficits and debt are quite 
variable and correlated with output and other sources of systematic risk. In (10)-(11), dt+n refers to 
the debt accumulated in various states of nature under a given fiscal policy, including new securities 
that may have to be issued along the way. Though bonds returns must satisfy the Euler equations  
   Et[ut,n ⋅ (1+ rt+k) k=0
n−1 ∏ ]=1∀(t,n),   
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ut,n generally differs from 1/ (1+ rt+k) k=0
n−1 ∏ , making bond returns unsuitable as discount rates in (10-
11). Conditions (10-11) do not imply (9); sustainability may indeed require that the ad hoc condition 
(9) is violated.  
  If one combines (11) with the debt dynamics in (5) and assumes all relevant sums converge, 
one obtains  
  dt
* = Et[ut,n ⋅ st+n]
n=0
∞
∑ . [IBC]  (12) 
This Intertemporal Budget Constraint is derived from optimizing lender behavior. It asserts that an 
initial debt must be backed by the present value of future primary surpluses, but it differs from the ad 
hoc condition (8) because the correct discount rates for future surpluses depend on the distribution of 
future primary surpluses across states of nature. 
  Some example help illustrate how the sustainability conditions (11-12) compare to the ad hoc 
conditions (8-9).  
Example 1 [Risk Neutrality]:  
Suppose lenders are risk-neutral and have a constant rate of time preference β =1/(1+ r). Then the 
pricing kernel reduces to the deterministic discount factor ut,n =βn =1/(1+ r)n. So (11-12) reduce to 
(8-9)./// 
  The ad hoc conditions (8-9) can thus be interpreted as special cases of (11-12). More 
generally, (11-12) reduce to (8-9) if ut,n is uncorrelated with st+n and with dt+n and consistent with 
a constant discount factor. 
Example 2 [Motivated by Ahmed-Rogers (1995)]: 
Suppose  ut,n =βn ⋅µ(ct /ct+n) is the product of a time-preference factor βn and a marginal rate of 
substitution  µ(ct /ct+n) with µ'> 0 (homothetic preferences with declining marginal utility). 
Suppose Et[µ(ct /ct+n)]=1 for all t; and suppose marginal rates of substitution have time-invariant 
conditional covariances with st+n in real terms, covt(µ(ct /ct+n),st+n) =σn∀t. Then 
βn = Et[ut,n]=1/(1+ r)n can be interpreted as the safe discount factor and 
  Et[ut,n ⋅ st+n]= Et[ut,n]⋅ Et[st+n]+ βn ⋅σn = (Et[st+n]+σn)/( 1+ r)n  
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is an expected value plus a covariance term. If σ = βnσn n≥0 ∑ is finite (e.g. for bounded σn and 




(1+ r)n ⋅ Et[st+n]
n=0
∞
∑ +σ , (8*) 
which is equivalent to (8) plus a constant./// 
  Example 2 demonstrates why expected value conditions like (8-9) do not provide credible 
information about sustainability. If (8*) is satisfied with non-zero σ, a researcher “testing” (8) would 
naturally conclude that public debt includes a “bubble” of size σ. Conversely, finding (8) satisfied or 
violated by empirical data provides no information about (12) unless one can reliably estimate the 
covariances between surpluses and discount factors. 
  Example 2 is motivated by Ahmed and Rogers (1995), who examine sustainability in a setting 
similar to Example 2, namely with constant covt(ut,n,st+n) for all t and n. Ahmed-Rogers use this 
setting to argue that a stationary real with-interest deficit is necessary and sufficient for (12), and 
therefore informative about model-based sustainability. Example 2 serves to demonstrate the opposite, 
however. Following Ahmed and Rogers’ necessity proof, it is straightforward to show that both (8) 
and (8*) imply a stationary with-interest deficit. It does not help to distinguish sustainable from 
unsustainable policies. (Intuitively, the constant term does not affect unit root considerations.) Ahmed 
and Rogers’ sufficiency proof imposes various auxiliary assumptions on the stochastic process for 
debt. Example 2 suggests that these assumptions are unduly restrictive.9 In conclusion, unit root 
analysis is suitable for testing ad-hoc sustainability, but not informative about model-based conditions 
like (10-12). 
  To what extent are differences between (8) and (8*) is quantitatively important? Recall from 
Table 1 that U.S. primary deficits were positive on average for 1792-2003. If the deficit process is 
ergodic, one must conclude that the unconditional expectation of U.S. primary surpluses is negative, 
making a zero or negative contribution to the r.h.s. of (8*). Table 1 suggests therefore that U.S. public 
                                                      
9 Notably, they assume debt has an absolutely summable MA representation and then proceed to take differences of various 
infinite sums of innovations.  In the context of Example 2, Ahmed and Rogers’ constant covariance assumption would imply 
σ =∞ , cautioning against assuming the convergence of infinite sums in this context.  
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debt is backed entirely by the covariance expressions in (8*) and (12). The next example provides an 
interpretation. 
Example 3 [Stochastic Growth, adapted from Bohn (1995)]: 
For the same pricing kernel as in Example 2, suppose consumption and government outlays are fixed 
fractions of GDP (ct /Yt = c ,Gt /Yt = G ), real GDP growth γt is i.i.d. with mean γ, public debt 
consists of safe securities, tax revenues vary with output growth to maintain a constant end-of-period 
debt-GDP ratio Dt /Yt = d . Assume zero inflation to avoid nominal/real distinctions. 
  A constant debt-GDP ratio requires real primary surpluses that are negatively correlated with 
GDP growth, 
  st+n =Tt+n −G ⋅Yt+n =(1+ r)⋅ Dt+n−1 −d ⋅Yt+n = d Yt+n−1⋅(1+ r−γt+n). (13) 
Because µ(ct+n−1/ct+n) = µ[1/(1+ γt+n)] and st+n are both decreasing in γt+n, policy (13) features 
a positive covariance between the pricing kernel and the primary surplus. More specifically, real debt 
in the No Ponzi condition must be discounted at the discount rate on GDP-indexed claims,  








n dt  
where  1/(1+ R) ≡ Et[ut,1⋅(1+ γt+1)]/(1+ γ). Dynamic efficiency implies R > γ and ensures that 
discounted real debt converges to zero, demonstrating that a policy with constant debt-GDP ratio 
satisfies (11-12).  
  Nothing in the argument above depends on the relationship between the growth rate γ and the 
interest rate r. Because ut,1 and γt+1 are negatively correlated, the safe rate is unambiguously below 
the discount rate on GDP-indexed claims, r < R, and it may be below γ. If  E[(1+ r)/( 1+ γt)]<1, 
then  Et[st+n]< 0 for all (t,n). Despite negative expected surpluses, the policy is sustainable. /// 
  The intuition for Example 3 is that the period-by-period safety of government bonds is so 
highly valued by investors that the government can run negative surpluses on average, provided it 
promises positive payouts in “bad” states of nature, i.e., states where the ex-post realization of GDP 
growth is low enough that (1+ r)/( 1+ γt) >1. The condition  E[(1+ r)/( 1+ γt)]<1 essentially  
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requires a safe interest rate below the average growth rate, apart from a Jensen’s inequality term. Table 
2 suggests that U.S. data satisfy this condition. 
  In relation to Example 2 and to Ahmed-Rogers, Example 3 illustrates the pitfalls of 
discounting at government bond rates. Policy (13) exhibits a positive covariance between primary 
deficit and pricing kernel, matching the assumptions of Example 2. But (8*) is not well defined for 
E[(1+ r)/( 1+ γt)]<1 because the primary surplus term in (8*) diverges to minus infinity while the 
covariance term σ diverges to plus infinity. 
  Example 3 also helps to illustrate the role of debt management and of asset pricing 
considerations. For example, if government debt in Example 3 consisted of GDP-indexed bonds, 
policy (13) would require positive average primary surpluses. Or, if risk aversion were to decline, 
government bond yields would adjust and require a different level of surpluses. To determine the 
complete set of sustainable government policies, one would have to specify fiscal policy in a complete 
way, including a specification of debt management and of state-contingent variations in primary 
surpluses; and the results would rely critically on asset pricing assumptions. 
  Finance theory unfortunately does not provide an empirically successful model for 
discounting safe and risky payment streams. The leading asset pricing theory—consumption CAPM—
is a dismal failure when it comes to explaining empirical risk premiums (Mehra and Prescott 1985). 
An empirically credible, complete characterization of sustainable policies is therefore an impossible 
task. A more promising agenda is to strive for sufficient conditions that are robust with respect to asset 
pricing and debt management. 
6. Testing Model-Based Sustainability 
The second main question about sustainability is how to test if an observed policy is on a trajectory 
consistent with (11-12).  
  Because testing requires a well-defined alternative hypothesis, the first follow-up question is 
how to think about policies that violate (10-12). There are at least three relevant interpretations. First, 
fiscal policy may operate in an economy where (10) does not apply. In an overlapping generations  
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economy, for example, lenders have finite planning horizons and do not impose transversality 
conditions. If interest rates are sufficiently low, reasonable policies will not satisfy (10-12). Conditions 
(10-12) may also be inapplicable in economies with incomplete markets where liquidity arguments 
enter into the pricing of government bonds. Bohn (1999a) provides an example where government 
bonds have lower transactions cost than private loans; for low levels of public debt, the government 
bond rate is below the GDP growth rate, leading to a violation of (10) in a dynamically efficient 
economy with rational, infinitely-lived agents. It is therefore an empirical question if (10) is a 
constraint on government policy. 
  Second, fiscal policy may be constrained by (10), but a continuation of the policy observed 
during the sample period would violate (12) in the direction of too low surpluses. This may be called 
an empirical violation of the sustainability conditions, or more succinctly, a non-sustainable policy. If 
rational investors are nonetheless buying government bonds, they must be expecting a policy shift that 
will support the debt. An empirical violation of sustainability can therefore be interpreted as signaling 
a policy shift. The shift may be an increase in taxes, a reduction in outlays, or—because revenues 
include transfers from the Federal Reserve—an increased reliance on seignorage.10 
  Third, an empirical violation of (10-12) in the direction of too low surpluses may signal that 
the government will eventually default on its debt. If government bonds are traded, this scenario raises 
questions about the rationality of investor expectations. Rational investors should never buy the public 
debt at a price above the r.h.s. of (12), and they should never buy new government bonds, nor 
refinance maturing ones, unless the government provides credible assurances that (10) is satisfied. 
Though default considerations may explain minor violations of (12) if debt is measured at face value, 
a scenario that requires irrational investors seems implausible. In summary, empirical violations of 
sustainability are best interpreted as indicating either a future shift in policy or an economic 
environment in which policy is not constrained by (10).  
                                                      
10  See Section 7 for monetization and for comments on the fiscal theory of the price level. See Bohn (1991b) for tax and 
spending responses to deficits. Note that a violation of (11-12)  in the direction of too high surpluses is consistent with (10) 
and cannot be ruled out.  
19 
  Turning to the search for robust sustainability conditions, a key insight is that the Euler 
equations  Et[ut,n ⋅ (1+ rt+k) k=0
n−1 ∏ ]=1 apply in any economy with well-defined pricing kernel, 
regardless of what that pricing kernel might be. Combining (11) and (5), one can see that a fiscal 
policy of zero primary surpluses always yields a limiting value of debt equal to initial debt. That is, if 
st+k ≡ 0∀k, then 
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* for all n  (14b) 
so  lim
n→∞
Et[ut,n ⋅ dt+n]= dt
*.  
The key point here is not that a Ponzi scheme violates the No Ponzi condition—a reassuring fact—but 
that the limit value can be computed without assuming a specific asset-pricing model. Because the 
Euler equations apply to all financial assets, including government liabilities of any type—long-term 
and short-term, nominal and inflation-indexed—they impose no restrictions on debt management. 
Using the Ponzi scheme limit as reference point, analogous reasoning helps prove the sustainability of 
policies with systematically less debt accumulation. 
  A second key insight is that robustness with respect to debt management requires a feedback 
rule for the primary surplus—a rule that makes surpluses a function of initial debt. To see this, 
suppose primary surpluses were unresponsive to initial debt and consider a slight variation in debt 
management. If the policy was sustainable before, a change in debt management that increases the 
return on debt in one state of nature and reduces the return in another state (respecting the Euler 
equation) will raise initial debt in the high return state. Without a policy response, the extra debt would 
be unbacked by future surpluses, violating the No Ponzi condition.  
  The most simple feedback rule that ensures sustainability is a linear one: 
Proposition 1 [Bohn (1991a, 1998)]: Suppose the primary-deficit/GDP ratio is an increasing linear 
function of the initial debt GDP-ratio  
  st = ρ⋅ dt
* + µt   (15)  
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for all t, where ρ>0 is a constant and µt is a composite of other determinants. If µt is bounded as 
share of GDP and if the present value of GDP is finite, then fiscal policy satisfies (11-12).///  
  Proposition 1 suggests that sustainability can be tested by estimating a policy rule (or reaction 
function) for the primary surplus/GDP. The idea of the proof is that debt growth is reduced by (1−ρ) 
relative to a Ponzi scheme, reducing the n-period ahead debt by about a factor (1−ρ)n. For any 
(small)  ρ > 0, this implies  Et[ut,n ⋅ dt+n] ≈ (1− ρ)n ⋅ dt
* →0; the µt-part turns out to be 
asymptotically irrelevant. 11 
  The assumptions of Proposition 1 can be weakened in various ways, for example by allowing 
for non-linearity and for time-varying coefficients. A non-linear feedback rule ensures sustainability if 
the slope is bounded away from zero at high debt-GDP ratios. That is, if there is a finite value  ˆ  d  and a 
function  f (d) such that  f (d) ≥ ρ⋅(d − ˆ  d  )∀d ≥ ˆ  d , then the policy rule st = ρ⋅ f (dt
*)+ µt is also 
sustainable (Bohn 1998). A time-varying policy rule st = ρt ⋅ dt
* + µt ensures sustainability if 
ρt ≥ 0∀t and ifρt>0 applies infinitely often (Canzoneri et al (2001). Non-linearities and time-
variation may, however, raise questions about the stability of policy and  hence about the plausibility 
of extrapolating it into the future. Prop. 1 can also be strengthened by excluding seignorage from st, to 
ensure that sustainability is not attained through monetization. 
  Before estimating (15), the implicit stationarity and ergodicity assumptions should be 
acknowledged. Stationarity is commonly assumed in applied economies, but unusually important here 
because sustainability can only be evaluated by extrapolating current policies into the indefinite future. 
In practical terms, the entire history of U.S. fiscal policy displays no more than 3-5 big movements in 
the debt-GDP ratio, suggesting that even decades of data are potentially unrepresentative or dominated 
by a single event. For this reason, my estimates below are based on longest available sample, 1792-
2003. 
                                                      
11 Though Proposition 1 is asserted in Bohn (1998), the formal statement and proof were unfortunately placed into an 
unpublished appendix on request of the editor (available at http://econ.ucsb.edu/~bohn). Canzoneri et al. (2001) present a 
remarkably similar sustainability proposition, equivalent to Prop.1 in all respects except that ρ is replaced by a time-varying 
coefficient (see below). Prop. 1 and its proof were first circulated in Bohn (1991a) and presented at Georgetown University 
in January 1992.  
21 
  Ergodicity is critical because one only observes a single realization of history from which one 
must infer how policy responds to disturbances and how it would respond under various 
contingencies. This may be impossible. A non-linear rule may, for example, show no evidence of a 
feedback from debt primary surpluses if debt happens to be below  ˆ  d  throughout the sample; or in case 
of a time-varying rule, all the within-sample ρt-values may equal zero. The ergodicity problem 
reinforces the notion that Proposition 1 is sufficient but not necessary. A stable, positive feedback 
from debt to surplus would justify calling fiscal policy sustainable, whereas a missing or seemingly 
unstable feedback would consistent with either a non-sustainable policy or with a data set insufficient 
for identification. The implicit stationarity and ergodicity assumptions apply analogously to unit root, 
cointegration, and VAR-based tests. They seem unavoidable because sustainability constraints are 
inherently forward looking. 
  Equation (15) also raises unit root issues. First, if the debt-GDP ratio had a unit root and µt is 
stationary, ρ>0 would imply cointegration between debt and primary surplus. Eq. (15) would then 
satisfy Trehan-Walsh’s sustainability conditions. Table 5 indicates a stationary primary surplus, 
however, ruling out the case of cointegration. Second, a stationary primary surplus/GDP combined 
with a unit root in debt might be considered evidence against ρ>0. It is important therefore that there is 
no credible evidence for a unit root in U.S. debt/GDP. Third, unit roots require attention because their 
(alleged) presence can serve as convenient excuse to leave out stationary regressors—here, to avoid 
modeling µt. But because the debt-surplus linkage seems to involve stationary variables, one cannot 
ignore µt without creating omitted variables problems.  
  Policy function (15) may also be of interest in economies where (10-12) do not necessarily 
apply. My intuition for such economies is that a failure of (10-12) signals an inefficiently low level of 
public debt. This intuition works for dynamically inefficient OG economies, where higher public debt 
would raise interest rates and move the economy into dynamic efficiency, increasing welfare along the 
way. In such economies, if public debt has declined because of some disturbance, a positive response 
of surpluses (as in (15)) would help restore an efficiently high level of debt. The same intuition applies 
to models with transactions cost where public debt is prized for its liquidity (e.g., Bohn 1999a). If the  
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public’s demand for liquidity so high that the government can run Ponzi schemes at low levels of debt, 
an increase in public debt would be Pareto-improving. A positive response of surpluses to declines in 
debt should again help avoid an inefficiently low public debt. 
  More stringent constraints than (10) may apply in economies where the government has a 
limited ability to tax. As shown by McCallum (1984), the No Ponzi condition can be satisfied by 
policies that let the debt-GDP ratio and the tax-GDP ratio increase exponentially at a rate just 
marginally below the discount rate. An upper limit on tax rates would impose an upper bound on the 
present value of revenues on the r.h.s. of (12), i.e., an upper bound on the debt-GDP ratio. In addition, 
restrictions on debt management would be needed to avoid fluctuations in the return on debt that might 
push debt above the limit. The feedback rule (15) is promising in this context because it naturally 
stabilizes the debt-GDP ratio. If µt and rt+1 are stationary, the debt-GDP ratio will fluctuate around a 
mean of  E[dt
*] ≈− µ /[ρ− r (1− ρ)]. The magnitude of fluctuations around the mean and the tax limit 
are unfortunately difficult to estimate, and beyond the scope of this paper. One may loosely interpret 
the gap between the estimated mean debt and the historical maximum of debt/GDP (which was 
evidently sustainable) as a policy’s margin of safety against shocks. 
6. Estimating the Determinants of the Primary Surplus 
This section estimates policy functions for 1792-2003 U.S. data. The approach is similar to Bohn 
(1998) but applied to a longer data set. Guidance for the regression specification is obtained from tax 
smoothing theories of optimal taxation. Tax smoothing suggests that temporary government outlays 
and temporary declines in income (i.e., in the tax base) trigger higher than normal budget deficits. This 
suggests an empirical specification for the primary surplus of the form 
  st = ρ⋅ dt
* + β0 + βg ⋅ ˜  g  t + βy ⋅ ˜  y  t +εt (16) 
where  ˜  g  t is a measure of temporary outlays,  ˜  y  t measures temporary output, εt is a mean-zero error 
term, and (ρ,β0,βg,βy) are regression coefficients. 
  Finding empirical proxies for  ˜  y  t and  ˜  g  t for a long sample is a challenge, but important to 
identify the marginal effect of public debt. Individuals living at the time presumably had better  
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information about business cycle conditions than a researcher can obtain from historical data. For 
economic fluctuations, I simply assume that individuals were able to distinguish trends from cycles in 
real time as well as an economist can do looking back, using an HP-filter to extract the trend 
component of log real GDP. The gap between actual value and trend is taken as proxy for  ˜  y  t (with 
positive values indicating above-trend output). Fluctuations in government outlays are dominated by 
wartime military spending. Because an HP-filter would impute an implausible degree of foresight 
about the start, end, and intensity of wars, the permanent component of military outlays/GDP is 
computed from an estimated AR(2) process.12 Non-military outlays are well approximated by a 
random walk, i.e. have no significant temporary component. The difference between actual and 
estimated permanent military outlays is used as proxy for  ˜  g  t. 
  Table 7 presents the main policy function estimate in Col.1 and several alternatives in Col.2-5. 
All estimates are OLS. To account for heteroskedasticity, both ordinary and heteroskedasticity-
consistent standard errors are shown (both in brackets). Col.1 displays estimates of specification (16). 
The coefficient on initial debt is significantly positive, as consistent with sustainability. The 
coefficients on temporary output and on temporary spending are positive and negative respectively, as 
consistent with tax smoothing. Taking sample means of the regressors, all five regressions imply a 
stationary debt-GDP ratio with mean of around 25%, far below the historical peak of above 100%, 
suggesting a substantial margin of safety against unexpected shocks. 
  To examine robustness, Col.2 adds a time trend, finding no significant effect. Col.3 adds the 
squared deviation of public debt from its mean to explore a potential non-linearity in the surplus-to-
debt relationship, also finding no significant effect. Col.4 replaces  ˜  g  t by actual military spending to 
document that the benchmark results are insensitive to alternative specifications for  ˜  g  t. As motivation, 
note that for any Markov process, temporary and permanent components are linear in the current 
value. Hence Col.4 yields consistent estimates for ρ for any Markov specification for military outlays. 
Col.5 replaces the primary surplus by the primary surplus excluding seignorage (transfers from 
                                                      
12 The estimated AR(2) process is gt
mil = 0.59%+1.28gt−1
mil −0.43gt−2
mil plus error term. The permanent component 
is computed with a discount rate of 2 percent.  
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Federal Reserve to Treasury). The coefficients are virtually unchanged and document that the debt-to-
surplus feedback is not due to monetization.  
  Quite different results are obtained if one omits proxies for  ˜  y  t and  ˜  g  t. This is documented in 
Table 8. Col.1 displays a VAR-style estimate of the surplus-debt relationship, in the spirit of 
Canzoneri et al. (2001). Initial debt still has a positive impact on the surplus, but the impact is smaller 
and less significant. In Col.2, which displays a simple bivariate regression, the coefficient on debt is 
near zero and insignificant. The small coefficients in Col.1-2 are suggestive of an omitted variables 
bias. To reinforce this point, Col.3 returns to specification (16) but with the lagged primary surplus 
and lagged debt as additional regressors. Though the lagged surplus is significant, the estimates are 
similar to Table 7 and the coefficient on debt is above 0.10. 
  An omitted variables problem may also explain the failure to reject a unit root for the debt-
GDP ratio in Table 5. If one includes  ˜  y  t and  ˜  g  t into an ADF-regression for the debt-GDP ratio (not 
tabulated), the t-statistic on lagged debt jumps to –4.0 in an otherwise identical specification (vs. –2.86 
in Table 5). The latter indicates significant mean-reversion even at Dickey-Fuller critical values;. The 
impact of  ˜  y  t and  ˜  g  t suggests omitted variables bias in the standard ADF regressions—not under the 
unit root null, but under the alternative, leading to a lack of power. 
  All specifications with  ˜  y  t and  ˜  g  t yield estimates for ρ in the 0.10 to 0.12 range. This is 
substantial above my previous 1916-1995 estimates of about 0.05 (Bohn 1998). A closer examination 
of the time series suggests that the higher coefficients here are due to the interaction of public debt and 
military spending during the Cold War era (narrowly defined, 1954-1964; more broadly, 1954-1989). 
Because 20
th century samples are dominated by this period, the longer sample helps to put it in 
perspective.  
  The Cold War era is important empirically because it displays both a major decline in the 
debt-GDP ratio—the key phenomenon for sustainability—and a persistently above-average level of 
military outlays. Military outlays exceeded 10% of GDP for 1951-64 and remained above 6% until 
1989, far above the 4% sample mean. These persistently above-average outlays are in contrast to the 
quick declines in military outlays after previous wars.   
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  In their classic articles on tax smoothing, Barro (1986a,b) and Sahasakul (1986) follow 
Barro’s (1981) modeling of military outlays as non-stationary. Using 1932-78 data, Barro (1981) 
regressed the first difference of military outlays on the casualty rate in major wars and on military 
capital. The implied series for permanent military outlays tracks actual outlays quite closely in the 
post-1953 period. That is, Cold War military outlays are treated as permanent, not as temporary 
spending that might justify budget deficits. The above-average surpluses during 1955-64 are then 
interpreted as a modest response to a far-above-average debt-GDP ratio, consistent with ρ~0.05. 
  In Table 7, in contrast, temporary outlays are based on a stationary model for the military 
outlays/GDP ratio, as is consistent with the unit root tests in Table 5.13 The estimated mean-reversion 
is fast enough that above-average outlays are interpreted as largely temporary. If interpreted as 
temporary, the high outlays during the Cold War should have triggered below-average surpluses. Then 
the observed above-average surpluses can only be interpreted as a strong response to the high post-
WWII debt-GDP ratios, consistent with ρ~0.12. 
  Table 9 documents the implications of different measures for  ˜  g  t. Col.1 uses Barro’s measure 
for 1916-1995 (a sample limited by data availability). For comparison, Col.2 displays results for my 
benchmark specification restricted to the same sample. The Barro-style specification yields a much 
smaller response to initial debt, ρ~7% in Col.1 versus ρ~14% in Col.2.  
  It is an open question if the stationary representation or Barro’s measure better represents 
public perceptions of Cold War outlays. If the Cold War was perceived as a regime switch, it may be 
appropriate to use different estimates for  ˜  g  t for different subsamples. In this spirit, Col.3 uses Barro’s 
˜  g  t-measure for 1916-1995 and my AR(2) measure for all other years. This yields a full sample 
estimate for ρ of 6.9%. (Using Barro’s measure for 1946-1965 only would yield a similar value, 
7.2%.)  
  Overall, reasonable estimates for the surplus-to-debt response range from 6.9% to 12.1% 
(using Table 9, Col.3 and Table 7, Col.1), depending on the interpretation of Cold War spending. The 
                                                      
13 Apart from the stationarity issue, Barro’s (1981) specification for military outlays becomes unworkable when applied 
sample periods that include the Civil War. Civil War casualties were so high that Barro’s regression coefficients would 
predict negative outlays; or if one constrained the coefficients to avoid negative values, casualty rates would become 
irrelevant for other periods.  
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Cold War interpretation is just quantitative issue, however. Sustainability is satisfied for either 
interpretation because all estimates for ρ are significantly positive.  
7. Related Issues 
This section briefly addresses three issues related to sustainability—seignorage, the fiscal theory of the 
price level, and the measurement of public liabilities. Neither will affect the findings above, but they 
should be clarified to avoid unnecessary questions.  
  Because Treasury revenues include Federal Reserve transfers, the IBC could be satisfied in 
principle by a fiscal authority that is oblivious to accumulating debt and a central bank that monetizes 
the debt. This would make seignorage the debt-responsive component of the primary surplus. For the 
U.S., seignorage is empirically trivial, however, averaging to 0.16% of GDP for 1915-2003. In Table 
1, primary surpluses would be negative on average even if one excluded seignorage. In Table 7, Col.5 
documents the negligible role of seignorage. Debt and seignorage actually have a slightly negative 
correlation, providing no indication that debt is monetized. Seignorage is also an issue during the 
Greenback period of 1862-1879. Public debt includes non-interest bearing debt such as Greenbacks, 
but because no interest payments are involved, the primary surpluses are unaffected.    
  The fiscal theory of the price level (FTPL) treats equations like (8) or (12) as equilibrium 
conditions for the market value of government debt rather than constraints (e.g., Cochrane 1988). This 
is related to the default-story for violations of (10) discussed in Section 5, but with more specific 
assumptions. Lenders’ rationality and the No Ponzi condition are taken for granted and debt is 
assumed nominal. Its value is equated to the present value of surpluses through endogenous changes in 
the nominal price level.  
  The FTPL unfortunately starts off with a pre-existing nominal debt and ignores the conditions 
under which such debt can be issued. Once a debt is outstanding, the government has obvious 
incentives to default. This applies not only to nominal debt and inflation, but to any type of debt 
because a sovereign government can always declare a default. The No Ponzi condition implies that 
rational lenders will not buy government bonds unless the government can commit to return the  
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present value—not necessarily deterministically but in present value. The FTPL thus implicitly 
assumes that lenders allow the government to pursue time-inconsistent policies.  
  From a starting position with no debt, the IBC is clearly a constraint. Indeed, a government 
that can’t commit to honor its debt will have to run balanced budgets on a period-by-period basis, or 
maintain reserves. With rational lenders, a commitment to satisfy the No Ponzi condition is precisely 
the commitment the government has to make to sell bonds. Once made, such a commitment is 
reasonably called a constraint. Thus, the FTPL does not invalidate the intertemporal budget constraint. 
  Another challenge for testing sustainability is the question how to treat implicit government 
obligations that are not recognized as official debts. In the U.S., the main ones are commitments to 
social security and Medicare. The Unified Budget accounts for these programs as discretionary 
transfer schemes. One alternative is to treat the present value of accrued obligations (say, using 
corporate defined benefit pension accounting) as a liability and to examine its sustainability like the 
sustainability of public debt. This approach is unfortunately problematic because social security 
obligations are difficult to value (see Bohn 1992) and because the available data are inherently non-
stationary—historically because of the “first generation” startup/expansion phase and prospectively 
because of the baby boom. A second alternative is to treat social security and Medicare as political 
commitments and examine their political sustainability. Pursuing this approach, Bohn (1999b) and 
(2004) find that both social security and Medicare are sustainable in the sense that substantial majority 
of U.S. voters will have financial incentives to vote for their continuation, now and in the foreseeable 
future.  
8. Conclusions 
The paper examines the sustainability of U.S. fiscal policy, finding substantial evidence in favor. I first 
summarize the U.S. fiscal record from 1792-2003 and show that growth effects have historically 
covered the entire interest cost of the U.S. debt. I then review sustainability conditions based on 
expected-value budget constraints and provide a unified presentation of the implied unit root tests. I 
conclude that fiscal series not scaled by GDP are misleading in the context of unit root testing and that  
28 
there is no credible evidence of a unit roots in the U.S. debt-GDP and deficit-GDP ratios. The main 
evidence in favor of sustainability is the finding of a robust positive response of primary surpluses to 
variations in initial debt. The policy functions for primary surpluses are similar to Bohn (1998), but 
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Figure 1: The U.S. Budget Deficit 
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Figure 2: The U.S. Public Debt,  
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    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
1792  2003  1.2% 0.3% 0.9% 1.3% 0.8% 0.5% 0.0% 
1792  1868  0.4% -0.1% 0.5% 0.6% 0.5% 0.1% -0.1% 
1869  2003  1.7% 0.5% 1.2% 1.7% 1.0% 0.7% 0.0% 
1792  1914  0.1% -0.4% 0.5% 0.5% 0.5% 0.0% -0.3% 


















      (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) 
  1792  2003  4.5% 5.2% 3.8% 1.4% -0.6% 
 1792 1868  4.8% 4.9% 4.2% 0.6% -0.1% 
 1869 2003  4.4% 5.3% 3.5% 1.8% -1.0% 
 1792 1914  4.6% 4.3% 4.1% 0.2%  0.4% 
 1915 2003  4.4% 6.4% 3.4% 3.1% -2.1% 
  
 
Table 3: Unit Root Tests for Real Fiscal Variables, 1792-2003 
 
Variable PP(12)  ADF(4)  KPSS(12)  Verdict 
Public Debt  -0.289  -0.174  0.325 **  Unit root 
Deficit, primary  -3.787 *  -5.814 **  0.076  Stationary 
Deficit (−s+ r⋅ d)  -4.143 **  -5.658 **  0.058  Stationary 
Deficit DEF /P  -3.578 *  -4.757 **  0.134  Stationary 
Revenues total  +1.614  +2.284  0.370 **   Unit root 
Outlays: non-interest  +2.799  +1.692  0.380 **  Unit root 
Outlays: military  -2.577  -2.804  0.349 **  Unit root 
Outlays: non-military  +7.144  +4.558  0.331 **  Unit root 










Notes: */** = significant at 5%/1%. PP(12) = Phillips-Perron test with 12-year autocorrelation window; ADF(4) = 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test with 4-th order autocorrelation; KPSS(12) = Kwiatkowski et al (1992) test with 12-year 
autocorrelation window. Verdict = Unit root if KPSS rejects and PP/ADF not; stationary, if ADF or PP reject and KPSS not. 
 
 
Table 4: Standard Deviations of Fiscal Variables 
 
   Split 1792-2003 sample in 1900   Split 1960-2003 sample in 1980 
 1792-1899  1900-2003 Ratio  1960-1980 1981-2003  Ratio 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Real Variables            
Primary Deficit  1.8  114.7  64.0  48.2  184.5  3.8 
Public Debt  11.9  1174.3  98.3  95.2  832.4  8.7 
GDP-shares            
Primary Deficit/GDP  2.29%  5.12%  2.2  1.15%  2.20%  1.9 
Public Debt/GDP  9.96%  22.44%  2.3  7.22%  6.82%  0.9 
 
Notes: Entries in col.1-2 and col.4-5 are standard deviations. The ratios in Col.3&6 are the two standard deviation values to 
the left of the ratio column.  
 
Table 5: Unit Root Tests for GDP-shares, 1792-2003 
 
Variable PP(12)  ADF(4)  KPSS(12)  Verdict 
Public  Debt  -2.834 -2.861 0.118  No  rejection 
Deficit, primary  -5.076 **  -5.587 **  0.073  Stationary 
Deficit (−s+ r⋅ d)  -6.354 **  -6.617 **  0.075  Stationary 
Deficit DEF /Y  -5.106 **  -5.594 **  0.047  Stationary 
Revenues total  -2.058  -1.971  0.328 **  Unit root 
Outlays: non-interest  -3.882 *  -3.766 *  0.236 **  All rejected 
Outlays: military  -3.593 *  -3.610 *  0.102  Stationary 
Outlays: non-military  -2.145  -1.913  0.334 **  Unit root 










Notes: See Table 3. 
 
Table 6: Unit Root Tests for Detrended Real Series, 1792-2003 
(Scaled by common exponential trend for GDP) 
Variable PP(12)  ADF(4)  KPSS(12)  Verdict 
Public Debt  -2.770  -3.017  0.100  No rejection 
Deficit, primary  -4.942 **  -5.579 **  0.049  Stationary 
Deficit (−s+ r⋅ d)  -5.702 **  -6.135 **  0.047  Stationary 
Deficit DEF /Y  -4.943 **  -5.568 **  0.068  Stationary 
Revenues total  -2.321  -2.251  0.295 **  Unit root 
Outlays: non-interest  -3.916 *  -4.074 *  0.208 *  All rejected 
Outlays: military  -3.661 *  -3.877 *  0.098  Stationary 
Outlays: non-military  -2.227  -1.813  0.330 **  Unit root 










Notes: See Table 3. In contrast to Table 3, all variables were divided by an exponential trend with growth rate 3.48%, the 
average growth rate of real log-GDP for 1869-2003.  
 
Table 7: Determinants of the Primary Surplus/GDP, 1793-2003 
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R-squared  0.689 0.691 0.691 0.690 0.697 
 
Notes: Estimates of equation (16) in the text. Entries are coefficient estimates. Entries in brackets are the ordinary t-
statistics and heteroskedasticity-consistent t-statistics, respectively. Temporary outlays are computed as different 
between actual military outlays from their permanent component as implied by an AR(2) process, except in Col.4. Col. 




Table 8: The Implications of Omitted Variables  











Eq.(16) & VAR 
style regressors 
(3) 
  Initial Debt dt










  0.366 
(4.2;2.5) 






  -0.007 
(-0.1;-0.1) 







output  ˜  y  t 
  0.099 
(2.8; 2.7) 
 Temporary 
outlays  ˜  g  t 
  -0.600 
(-12.9;-5.7) 
  R-squared  0.568 0.008 0.763 
 
Notes: Specifications as in Table 7 unless noted. The VAR-style regressions show the change in debt 
dt
* − dt−1
*  ss regressor instead of the lagged debt dt−1
*  to highlight the permanent effects of debt on 
surpluses and to avoid collinearity. If dt−1
*  were entered instead of dt
* − dt−1
*  in Col.1 and Col.3, neither 
would be individually significant, but the sum would be as significantly positive as the initial debt 
coefficients above.  
 
Table 9: Alternative Measures of Temporary Outlays  





Barro’s  ˜  g  t    
1916-1995 
 (1) 
AR(2) for  ˜  g  t    
1916-2003 
(3) 
Spliced  ˜  g  t  
1793-2003 
(2) 
  Initial Debt dt




























 R-squared 0.873  0.654  0.863 
 
Notes: Estimates of equation (16) in the text. Entries are coefficient estimates. Entries in brackets are the 
ordinary t-statistics and heteroskedasticity-consistent t-statistics, respectively. Regressors are as in Table 7. 
Col.1 uses Barro’s (1986a) GVAR variable for temporary outlays, as updated in Bohn (1998). Col.2 uses the 
same specification as Table 7, col.1, for a shorter estimation period. Col.3 combined Barro’s (1986a) GVAR 
variable for 1916-95 with the AR(2)  estimate from Table 7 for other years. 
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